This is a working version of the paper and soon will be replaced by new, extended version containing additional numerical simulations and new results. Numerical simulations revealed some new surprising patterns. In effect, some interpretations of the analytical results from this version are falsified by new results and will be substantially reformulated in the upcoming version. 
Introduction
Sex ratio evolution was the first problem in evolutionary theory that involved mathematical reasoning. This was done by German biologist Carl Dusing [1] . He argued that the fitness of a female using a particular sex ratio strategy can be described by the number of her grandchildren.
By application of this fitness measure it can be shown that the average strategy of females equal to 0.5 is evolutionarily stable. However, the population genetic approach focused on tracing the gene frequencies produces different predictions [2, 3, 4] . It shows that stable population states should be characterized by stable compositions of the female but also male subpopulation, not only by average strategy of females as, for example, in basic game theoretic approaches (see Introduction section in [6] for detailed discussion). In two previous papers [6, 7] , an alternative synthetic approach to modeling sex ratio evolution was introduced. The new model focuses on the dynamics of sex ratio evolution and tries to combine the phenotypic strategic approach with rigorous genetic analysis. This means that it explicitly considers parental male individuals as the passive carriers of female sex ratio strategies which can be expressed by their daughters if they inherit the strategy from the father. The first formulation [6] , is focused on the trajectories of global population parameters such as the primary and the secondary sex ratios and showed that sex ratio evolution dynamics are biphasic. This is caused by fact that equations describing male subpopulation and the secondary sex ratio converge to their stable manifolds faster than female subpopulation. During the first, rapid phase, the population converges to equality between the primary and the secondary sex ratios. Here we are approaching the topic of this paper. During the rapid phase, the male subpopulation is attracted by the unique state, conditional on the current state of the female subpopulation, called the male subpopulation equilibrium (thus the dynamics 4 converge to the MSE manifold. See sections 2, 3 and 5.3 in [6] for details). This phenomenon is caused by the mechanism of fitness exchange, a contribution of an individual to the fitness of individuals of other types by producing newborns of their type (see section 2 and appendix C in [6] for details). This result shows that the role of passive male carriers as fathers, not only as sons, is also very important. This riddle was partially solved in the second paper [7] , which is focused on the selection of genes encoding individual strategies. Selection of these genes depends only on sex ratios in carrier subpopulations rather than directly on trait values encoded by such genes (this self-regulation process can be called Fisherian Mechanism see section 2 and 3.1 in [7] for details). However, sex ratios in carrier subpopulations are determined by the action of female carriers of these genes and female partners of male carriers randomly drawn from the population in the process called Tug of War (see section 3.2 in [7] ). This means that the activity of female carriers attracts the sex ratio among carriers of the particular gene to the value of the encoded by that gene and the activity of random female partners attracts it to the actual value of the primary sex ratio. The Fisherian Mechanism and Tug of war together constitute the process which was termed double level selection. The question arise on the role of the MSE phenomenon in double level selection .When the MSE state is reached, selection on strategies appears to work according to the values encoded by the genes (this was shown by lemma 2 in [6] ). The new theory produces predictions similar to the classical theory; however, the mechanistic interpretation of the MSE phenomenon remains a mystery and will be analyzed in the present paper. Thus the main goal of this paper is to investigate the properties of the dynamic self-regulation mechanisms discovered in [7] (i.e. Fisherian Mechanism, Tug of War) and their relationships in the process of the double level selection when the trajectory reaches the close neighbourhood of the MSE manifold (sections 2 and 3). This will reveal the importance of the MSE mechanism in the dynamics of sex ratio self-regulation. The next step is investigation of the role of the MSE in the adjustment of However, it should be emphasized that the MSE is a specific example of the more general problem. The impact of the passive carriers of unexpressed genes (strategies) on the proliferation of those genes (strategies) may appear in many applications of population genetics and evolutionary game theory. Similar dynamic population equilibria can emerge in problems other than sex ratio evolution, where some fraction of individuals do not exhibit inherited traits, but transfer them to their offspring.
Next subsections will recall the formal details of the model presented in [6] and [7] and briefly summarize the results obtained there. However, please note that for full understanding of the presented results reading the [6] and [7] would be necessary. From section 2 new results will be presented.
Formal details of the model presented in the previous papers
Assume that a strategies are expressed by female carriers (as in basic game theoretic approaches and in Dusing's model [1] 
is the fraction of males in the population (a secondary sex ratio), and j j j P f  is the mean female subpopulation strategy (the primary sex ratio). Assume that each female produces k offspring according to haploid inheritance (with probability 0.5 for gene transfer from the focal parent). However, males are gene carriers too, and transfer those genes to their offspring. The influence of males can be described by the fitness exchange effect (i.e. daughters of male carriers affect the payoff of female carriers and sons of females affect payoff of males). This allows for derivation of the sex specific payoff functions, which is outlined below (see [6] Appendix C for detailed derivation). In [6] it was shown that
is the number of male offspring, and
is the number of female offspring, of the male individual. These functrions are average values of binomial distribution, where a trial is the production of a newborn (xk/y trials for a single male) and a success is the production of the individual of sex specified by the function (drawn with is the number of male offspring, of the female individual (k trials for a single female). Therefore we have the payoff functions for males andfemales, respectively, as:
-payoff function of males, (1)
-payoff function of females, (2) describing per capita number of newborns of the same sex and carried strategy than the focal 7 individual. Now we have all elements needed to formulate the multi-population replicator dynamics [8] . In the first paper [6] , this took the following form:
are the respective average payoff functions of the male, female and the whole population (see [6] Appendix D for derivation). This leads to the following system of equations (see [6] Appendix E for derivation):
It was shown that, for biological reasons, we can limit the analysis of the model to values of the primary and the secondary sex ratios over the interval ) 1 , 0 ( . The above formulation is similar to population genetics models and is focused on the composition of the whole population. In [7] the model was modified by a change of coordinates where the i-th gene) described in the above coordinates and discussed in details in section 2 and appendix B in [7] , is therefore:
Note that fitness function W g is independent of the value encoded by individual strategy P i . The fitness of a gene is determined by the sex ratio in a subpopulation of its carriers, M i . This leads to an alternative form of replicator equations (see section 2 and appendix C in [7] ):
dynamics of sex ratios in carriers subpopulations which take the form:
An analysis of the replicator equations based on the fitness function W g (see [7] sections 3.1 and 4.2) shows that changes in a gene pool can be described by the following inequalities:
This process can be described as the Fisherian mechanism (see sections 3.1 and 4.2 in [7] for details). Thus gene pool dynamics depends on the current value of the secondary sex ratio P and the sex ratio in the subpopulation of carriers of a gene i M . Parameter M i is determined by the action of female carriers of strategy P i as well as partners of male carriers of this strategy in a so-9 called tug of war mechanism, which means that the activity of female carriers attracts M i to the value encoded by the gene P i and the action of partners of male carriers attracts M i to the value of the females' average strategy pr P .
The male subpopulation equilibrium phenomenon
The role of the male subpopulation composition was shown by population genetic models of sex ratio evolution [2, 3, 4, 5] . In the MSE state (see sections 2.2 and 5.2 in [6] for details), the
is satisfied, and the subpopulation of males is in the state 
i f is stable when:
Note that this mechanism is similar to the Fisherian mechanism of evolution of gene frequencies (9) . This suggests that the role of the MSE is important in the process of sex ratio self-regulation.
The influence of male carriers is more important for the behavior of the system than the value of the secondary sex ratio P . The MSE is described by the unclear, nonintuitive
(see section 4.4 in [7] ). This paper will attempt to elucidate the nature of the MSE and specify how it affects the Fisherian and "tug of war" mechanisms. Thus, the next section starts the presentation of the new results. 10 2. The relationship between the MSE and the "tug of war" mechanism
As shown in the previous article [7] (sections 3.2 and 4.3 there), the sex ratio of the subpopulation of carriers of a given gene is self-regulated by the so-called "tug of war" mechanism mentioned here at the end of section 1.1 and this mechanism is described for each strategy by the equation:
How does the MSE phenomenon determines equilibria and the dynamics of the "tug of war"
process? The solution to this problem is described below by the following lemmas. Consider first how the MSE affects the sex ratio in the carrier subpopulation
Lemma 1
When the MSE condition (10) for strategy i P is satisfied, then according to the current value of pr P , we have:
and if the MSE condition is satisfied for all i , then the condition P P pr  can be maintained despite changes in gene frequencies
For proof see Appendix 1.
Therefore, the MSE state is equivalent to the unique sex ratio in the carrier subpopulation
and it is a necessary condition to make equality of the primary and the secondary sex ratios stable 11 despite changes in gene frequencies. The question arises about the role of i M in the "tug of war"
process.
Lemma 2 a)
i M is not a stationary point of the dynamics (8), but for the current value of pr P , the dynamics is attracted by the point pr i 
Lemma 3
If the MSE condition (10) is satisfied,
and population is in the polymorphic state, then:
Parameter 4. The effect of the MSE on the sex-specific payoff functions (1) and (2) and the "fitness exchange" effect 13 Let us examine the form of payoff functions if a population is in the MSE state.
Recall that male and female payoff functions (1) and (2) describe numbers of newborns of the same sex and carrying the same strategy than the focal individual. Lemma 4 describes the quantitative properties of the "fitness exchange" mechanism in the MSE state and its impact on sex-specific payoffs.
Lemma 4
When the MSE condition is satisfied and P P pr  then:
and a male's payoff (1) takes the form
and a female's payoff (2) has the form (10) 
This means that the product of the number of females per single male y x and the primary sex ratio in the entire population P is the mean strategy of females from subpopulation  (i.e., the subpopulation primary sex ratio). Then point (iii) from Lemma 4 can be generalized to the interesting property described by the following lemma.
Lemma 5
When the MSE condition is satisfied, then for subpopulation  , the following condition is satisfied:
In particular, Numerical solutions for the new model suggest that both approaches produce compatible predictions, if the male subpopulation equilibrium condition (MSE) is satisfied. However, there is no formal proof supporting these observations. In addition, the interpretation of the classical fitness measure as a Malthusian growth rate is problematic from the perspective of the new model. The classical static fitness measure (described as DFSM fuction in [6] ) relies on the number of grand offspring of a female, which expresses her individual strategy:
Note that according to point (ii) of Lemma 4 and Corollary 1 we have:
Thus the reproductive value of the male and female offspring of the focal female is equal to the reproductive value of the female carriers produced by the focal female and her "genetic brothers". describes the mean number of female partners of a male individual. Below is the analysis of the strategic equivalence of W and W g when the MSE condition is satisfied.
Lemma 6: On strategic compatibility of fitness measures
If the MSE condition is satisfied for all strategies, then the gene fitness function for any arbitrarily chosen strategies 1 P and 2 P has the form:
and the following condition is satisfied:
which means that both the new and classical fitness measures are compatible with regard to the relation of payoff dominance of strategies.
For a proof, see Appendix 6.
Note that in Lemma 6, only the MSE condition needs to be satisfied so that both fitness functions can produce compatible strategic predictions. The secondary sex ratio P may be far from equilibrium (which means P P pr  ). Therefore both functions are compatible on the level of static game theoretic analyses and the MSE is a sufficient condition for this. The question arises about the equivalence of both approaches on the grounds of population dynamics.
If we assume that 
Let us assume for simplicity that the mean brood size of a female is 2  k , which will remove this parameter from both formulae. In effect, two functions of parameters 2 P , there is some number of male carriers of unexpressed gene 2 P , acting as fathers. The DFSM fitness measure, which is related to the number of a female's grand offspring, disregards the role of male carriers on gene proliferation. Thus the classical fitness measure can be seriously biased in cases where an entire subpopulation carries a mutant gene, not only a single female (see Fig. 3 ). This bias may be strong for strategies close to 1 that produce mostly males.
7. Discussion -the "Fisherian" mechanism:
According to Lemma 1, the state of the male subpopulation equilibrium (in which all individuals from the population are produced by females from this population) is equivalent to the unique value of the sex ratio in the carrier subpopulation, equal to
. This is the connection between the value of the coded strategy -the "Tug of War" mechanism:
The value i M is not a stationary point in the "tug of war" dynamics, but for the current value of pr P , the dynamics is attracted by the point pr i
, which is also determined by the state of the male subpopulation equilibrium.
-the "fitness exchange" mechanism:
The MSE is the state where all female carriers of gene -the relationship between gene frequencies and the primary sex ratio:
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Another important relationship that is induced by the male subpopulation equilibrium is the equality ) 1 (
. This condition, presented in Section 3 (see Lemma 3), links changes in gene frequencies affected by the "Fisherian mechanism" with changes in the primary sex ratio (the female subpopulation mean strategy). This is the missing element closing the feedback loop of population self-regulation. In addition for every subpopulation consisting of all carriers of some genes the product of a subpopulation's primary sex ratio and the number of females per single male equals the analogous parameter for the whole population (Lemma 5).
-relationship between classical and the new theory
In the MSE state the DFSM fitness measure is equivalent to the sex specific female payoff W f and both of those fitness measures are biased approximations of the gene fitness functions W g .
The bias increases with the fraction of males among the offspring (see Fig. 1 and 2 ).
The relationship between subpopulation parameters and global population parameters induced by the MSE
The first important property is that the MSE state is necessary in all carrier subpopulations to maintain equality between the primary and the secondary sex ratios during changes in gene frequencies. However, there is another interesting property produced by the MSE phenomenon.
When the MSE condition is satisfied for all individual strategies, then the condition with other females (note that equivalent fitness measure disregards the impact of the male offspring). They are considered only as the sons of "mom's" ( [9] ). The strategic agent is a female individual. This produces a few problems. The first is a bias in estimation of the reproductive success which is problematic on the grounds of population dynamics. This is an example of the disadvantage of purely strategic models mentioned by [10] (more on this topic in [11, 12] ). In effect the basic interpretation of the payoff as the Malthusian growth rate is problematic in the case of the classical sex ratio game (dynamic models based on the Dussing's approach can be found for example in [13] ). This is an important problem, because the sex ratio game is a basic example of a nonlinear payoff function in every textbook on evolutionary game theory. A second problem is that the evolutionarily stable equilibrium (sex ratio of 0. . Therefore, the influence of female carriers on the payoff of a male carrier (described by component ) (
of payoff function (1)) is in equilibrium (the same for all and equal to
), whereas the influence of male carriers on the payoff of a female is not in equilibrium (it depends on the individual strategy and is equal to The results presented above attempt to interpret the MSE phenomenon. They suggest that the MSE constitutes a compensatory equilibrium between the production of female carriers of a gene by male carriers and the production of male carriers by female individuals (a fitness exchange effect). As was mentioned in the introduction, the MSE is an example of a more general class of problems. The MSE is related to population phenomena, such as stable demographic structure or Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium. In the new model, there is no demographic structure.
However, existing models that include demographic structure [14] report different behaviors before and after demographic equilibrium is reached. The results from this paper also suggest that the male subpopulation equilibrium is the state to which the population rapidly converges when Appendix 1
Proof of Lemma 1
Assume that the male subpopulation equilibrium condition 
The male subpopulation equilibrium condition is therefore equivalent to the following sex ratio value in the carrier subpopulation:
The last question addresses when equality P P pr  can be maintained despite changes in gene
(see section 2 in [7] ).
Equality of the primary and the secondary sex ratios therefore has the form:
The above equality will be independent of the value of j G if for all j , equality between the j -th coefficients of the sum is satisfied. Then j G reduces. In effect, we obtain:
From this formula we obtain:
After substituting P P pr  , we obtain condition on j M , which is equivalent to the sex ratio in the carrier subpopulation equivalent to the MSE state. This means that MSE state is necessary condition to maintain equality between the primary and the secondary sex ratios during changes in gene frequencies. 
For every value of i M from the interior of the unit interval, the right hand side of this equation
can be presented in the form:
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Thus by substitution of (22), we can transform (23) to:
Let us find the zero point from the interior of the unit interval of the right side of the equation transformed to the above formula:
In effect, we obtain the zero point:
Thus point a) is proven. 
By substituting
(according to MSE condition (10)) and pr P P  , we obtain:
. This is the relationship between i G and i f . Let us focus on the dynamics of parameter i G (7):
is responsible for the sign of the right side of this equation. We have assumed that the primary and the secondary sex ratios and that the MSE condition (10) is satisfied. Thus, by substituting pr P P  and condition (12) i pr
to (7), we obtain: 
.
Because
, The right hand side of equation (7) equals to:
Because  and ) 1 ( When we substitute this coefficient to payoff functions of males, which take the form (in terms of auxiliary symbols  and
, which describes the per capita normalized number of new male individuals produced by female carriers of strategy i P , will be equal to k P pr  5 . 0
. In effect,
, which is the proof of point (i).
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The analogous operation for the female payoff function takes the form:
By substituting the transformed MSE condition . After the substitution of the condition P P pr  , we obtain
. In effect, the female payoff function will have the form
, which is the proof of point (ii). , the MSE condition
can be described as:
The left side of this formula describes the number of male individuals produced by all female carriers of gene i P , and the right side describes the number of male individuals produced by female partners of male carriers of the gene, which is the proof of point (iii).
conditions (10) of all strategies in subpopulation  , we obtain:
In terms of exact numbers instead of related frequencies, this formula takes the form: Proof of Lemma 6
The gene fitness function has the form:
According to Lemma 1, the sex ratios in carrier subpopulations are affected by male subpopulation equilibrium and according to the results from [6] rapidly converge to:
When we substitute
, we obtain:
Thus the gene fitness function will then have the form:
In effect:
, then a higher ).
This means that it is profitable to produce the sex which is currently in the minority. This condition is fully compatible with the classical theory, thus ending the proof.
List of important symbols:
y -number of males x -number of females u -number of individual strategies 
